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A recent paper by Gunn–Allison–Abbott (GAA) [L.J. Gunn et al., Scientific Reports 4 (2014) 6461] 
argued that the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system could experience 
a severe information leak. Here we refute their results and demonstrate that GAA’s arguments ensue 
from a serious design flaw in their system. Specifically, an attenuator broke the single Kirchhoff-
loop into two coupled loops, which is an incorrect operation since the single loop is essential for the 
security in the KLJN system, and hence GAA’s asserted information leak is trivial. Another 
consequence is that a fully defended KLJN system would not be able to function due to its built-in 
current-comparison defense against active (invasive) attacks. In this paper we crack GAA’s scheme 
via an elementary current comparison attack which yields negligible error probability for Eve even 
without averaging over the correlation time of the noise.  
Keywords: KLJN secure key exchange system; directional coupler; unconditional security; 
experimental artifacts. 
 
1. Introduction 
Very recently, Gunn–Allison–Abbott (GAA) published a new type of attack [1]—which 
has been criticized in earlier papers of ours [2–4]—against the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-
noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system [5–11] and asserted, on the grounds of 
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experiments as well as simulation, that an extraordinarily large information leak could 
occur with cable losses of 0.1 to 1 dB. In particular, GAA found that at a cable loss of 1 
dB, and within a fraction of the correlation time of the noise, Eve can extract the key bit 
with an error probability of around 0.1, which means that her probability of successfully 
guessing the key bit is p ! 0.9 . If this claim were correct it would imply that Eve could 
separate Alice’s and Bob’s noises of very different intensities. Even though the validity 
of the mathematical claim concerning the unconditional security [5] of KLJN would 
remain intact, GAA’s assertions would—if correct—imply that applications of the KLJN 
scheme would be limited to intra-instrument or inter-chip security.  
 
At face value GAA’s claims may seem compelling, but efforts at the Department of 
Technical Informatics at the University of Szeged in Hungary to reproduce GAA’s 
experiment led to personal communication between GAA and us. Important unpublished 
details of GAA’s experiments were then disclosed, including the display of a serious 
design deficiency caused by the break-up the Kirchhoff loop in the KLJN system by an 
attenuator in order to provide the desired loss. This deficiency in GAA’s experiments led 
to their above-mentioned claims, but these claims are flawed and clearly founded on 
experimental artifacts. It should be emphasized that a complete (i.e., fully defended) 
KLJN scheme would not have been able to function at all under GAA’s conditions, 
which is a consequence of KLJN’s current comparison alarm [13].  
 
Even though the design flaw in GAA’s experiment is obvious once their experimental 
conditions were revealed, it is instructive to demonstrate its seriousness. In this paper we 
first briefly summarize a number of theoretical arguments why GAA’s attack cannot 
function, and we then analyze their experimental artifact and expose its information leak.  
 
 
2. Why the GAA attack cannot work 
 
We refer to our earlier work on the physical impossibility of low-frequency waves in 
short cables [3]—which is not directly related to security—and our detailed analysis of 
GAA’s scheme [2], as well as to general arguments [4] about the impossibility of 
directional couplers. This prior work leads to the following analysis of the problem at 
hand:   
 
(a) GAA’s attack [1] aims at creating a directional coupler to separate the noise 
components generated by Alice and propagating toward Bob, and generated by Bob and 
propagating toward Alice, in the KLJN scheme.  
 
(b) The GAA model assumes reflections and propagation at the electromagnetic phase 
velocity cp in the cable, which is justified only for waves. However, this is not a serious 
problem since linear response theory allows one to divide the low-frequency signal into 
short spikes for which the wave equation does work, to study the response to these spikes 
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separately (including reflected waves propagating at cp), and then to sum up these 
responses. 
 
(c) The wave based d’Alembert representation used by GAA [1] is well known and works 
for short transient signals. However, a directional coupler will provide the required output 
only as long as mixing of forward-going and reflected signals does not occur.  
 
(d) For low-frequency signals, i.e., in the quasi-stationary limit, reflections create a 
mixture of signals injected at the two ends of the cable. This leads to an effective phase 
velocity cpe, which is proportional to the resistance terminating the end toward which the 
wave propagates, as demonstrated by computer simulations in our earlier work [3]. It 
should be noted that cpe equals cp when the terminating resistor is equal to the wave 
impedance (which is 50 Ω in GAA’s work [1,3]).  
 
(e) However, GAA’s method [1] requires knowledge of cpe in both directions, which in its 
turn necessitates information on Alice’s and Bob’s resistance values. Consequently Eve 
cannot separate Alice’s and Bob’s signals unless she knows their magnitudes [2]. 
 
(f) Our earlier work [2] analyzed feature (e) mathematically and showed that if Eve, 
while attempting to extract Bob’s noise, assumed the correct value of cpe for wave 
propagation toward Bob she could indeed distinguish between Alice’s and Bob’s signals. 
However, if Eve assumed the wrong cpe value, i.e., the value for wave propagation toward 
Alice, then she would extract a non-existent noise that had the same mean-square value 
as Alice’s noise. In other words, Eve gets what she assumes: if she assumes a termination 
with the high resistance then her evaluated noise will agree with that assumption, but if 
she assumes a termination with the low resistance then her evaluated noise will agree 
with that assumption instead. Therefore Eve’s one-bit uncertainty persists within the 
GAA method. 
 
(g) GAA’s theoretical analysis and computer simulation results are in accordance with 
the above facts in (f), because both of them show that Eve cannot extract any information 
from a lossless cable [1]. Furthermore, GAA’s computer simulations for the smallest loss 
of 0.01 dB (see Fig. 3 in their work [1]) were in accordance with earlier experimental 
tests [10] of the KLJN system, which showed similar losses and thus a minor information 
leak that, however, could be remedied by simple privacy amplification [12]. 
 
(h) The only situations for which GAA were able to extract information were the set-ups 
with losses. This fact indicates that propagation effects were not the cause of the 
measured information leak but some other phenomenon. Unfortunately GAA did not 
show any cable-length-dependent information leak, which might have been used to test 
the real role of propagation delay effects. According to the information we received from 
GAA, there remained a significant loss, corresponding to 0.1 dB cable loss, in their 
system even at the experimental situation indicated as “zero loss”, which is not 
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immediately obvious from their paper [1]. Therefore GAA imply by “zero loss” that no 
additional attenuator was used to increase the losses.  
 
(i) GAA mention [1] that our recent defense method against wire resistance based attacks 
[14] protects also against the GAA attack. However, this defense method—originally 
developed against the Second Law attack—boosts the noise temperature at the lower 
resistance end [14]. The effectiveness of this defense method against GAA’s attack is 
another indication of the irrelevance of the propagation effects in GAA’s results. 
 
In conclusion, both our own [3] and GAA’s [1] theoretical analyses agree in that no 
information leak exists in the loss-free case whereas propagation delays are present. In 
the next section we will show that GAA’s experimental results, with attenuators to 
produce their required loss, contain a severe artifact which would have prohibited the 
functioning of a complete KLJN system as a consequence of its current-comparison 
defense against active attacks [13]. We show that Eve can extract the information by 
elementary measurements with very low error rate, virtually immediately, even without 
using GAA’s statistical tool [1]. 
 
 
3. Attenuator artifact in the GAA experiments, and its analysis 
 
The attenuator is a symmetrized voltage divider which provides not only attenuation but 
also 50 Ω input impedance when the far end of the cable is terminated by 50 Ω. Figure 1 
shows the 1 dB attenuator (with approximate values) and its incorporation into the KLJN 
loop. It is obvious that the shunt resistor  R2  breaks the originally single Kirchhoff loop 
into two loops with a common side. This is an incorrect realization of the KLJN system, 
because security has been guaranteed only for a single loop involving Alice and Bob. The 
violation inherent in GAA’s circuit is very significant, because the value of  R2  (500 Ω) 
is 20 times smaller than that of Bob’s resistor  RB  (10 kΩ) and two times smaller than 
Alice’s resistor  RA  (1 kΩ). These data prove that GAA’s experiments, in the cases with 
higher losses and information leak, were not conducted on the KLJN system but on 
something else. 
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Figure 1. Circuit diagram for the 1 dB attenuator applied by GAA to crack the KLJN scheme. U, R, I and t 
denote voltage, resistance, current and time, respectively. GAA’s 0.1 dB attenuator had the same structure with 
appropriate resistances. 
 
We show next that the time-dependent currents  IA (t)  and  IB(t)  of Alice and Bob, 
respectively, instead of being equal, as required for security, are strongly unbalanced, and 
Alice’s mean-square current is about five times larger than Bob’s. Straightforward circuit 
noise analysis provides the mean-square currents of Alice and Bob according to 
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where it is assumed that the resistors  R1  are much smaller than the total resistances of the 
loops;  SiA ( f )  and  SiB( f )  are (white) noise spectra for Alice’s and Bob’s currents; and 
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Bkljn  and  Teff  are noise bandwidth and effective noise temperature of the generators, 
respectively. Substituting the practical values used in GAA’s experiments, we obtain that 
 
 
IA
2 (t)
IB
2 (t)
= 4.95   ,             (3) 
 
which means that Alice’s mean-square current is about five times stronger than Bob’s. 
This extraordinary difference means that even the simplest comparison methods can 
extract information so that GAA’s complex statistical tool [1] is unnecessary. To 
illustrate this fact, we show below that a simple current comparison, without making 
statistics or averaging, is sufficient to create an efficient attack. 
 
Eve’s task, in order to extract the bit, is to guess which mean-square current is the larger 
one: Alice’s or Bob’s. According to Eq. (3) this task is equivalent to guessing, from a few 
measurement samples, if a current  I1(t)  with unit mean-square value  
 
 
I1
2(t) = 1  ,              (4) 
 
or another current  I2(t)  with mean-square value  
 
 
I2
2(t) = 4.95  ,              (5) 
 
is the larger. Without loss of generality, we use this example and assume that the values 
of the measurement noise currents are already normalized in accordance with Eqs. (4) 
and (5), which is straightforward because the magnitudes of 
 
IA
2 (t)  and 
 
IB
2 (t)  are 
theoretically known by Eve since all the resistors and the effective temperature are public 
knowledge [4–6]. 
 
The simplest protocol is to perform a single measurement on the currents and compare 
their square with the threshold 4.95. If one of the currents squared is greater than the 
threshold and the other is smaller, then Eve concludes that the first one is I2(t) . 
 
We obtain the following probabilities about the behavior of the square of a single 
measurement value of the current: 
 
 
P I1
2(t) < 4.95( ) = F1(4.95) =  0.974  
 
P I1
2(t) > 4.95( ) = 1! F1 4.95( )  =  0.026               (6) 
 
P I2
2(t) < 4.95( ) = F2(4.95) = F1 1( )  = 0.68  
 
P I2
2(t) > 4.95( ) = 1! F2 4.95( ) = 1! F1 1( )  = 0.32  
L.B. Kish, et al. 
7 
 
 
where  F1  and  F2  are the chi-squared distributions of  I1
2(t)  and  I2
2(t) , respectively, with 
one degree of freedom. 
 
The probability of successful (but not necessarily error-free) guessing, i.e.,  I1
2(t) < 4.95  
and  I2
2(t) > 4.95 , is 
 
 Ps = 0.974*0.32 = 0.31  .                     (7) 
 
In this case, Eve’s guess is
 
I1
2(t) < I2
2(t) . The error probability of this guess is 
 
 
P! = P I1
2 > 4.95( )  P I22 < 4.95( ) = 0.026*0.68 = 0.018 ,              (7) 
 
which is less than 2%, thus indicating over 98% fidelity of Eve’s successful guessing. 
 
It is obvious that the probability of “there is no answer”—i.e, when both measured values 
are below the threshold or when both of them are above the threshold—is given as 
 0.974*0.68+0.026*0.32 ! 0.67 . Thus on the average three measurements are needed to 
get an answer which will have over 98% fidelity. Three independent measurements can 
be done in three correlation times and yield Eve’s 1.8% error probability. Very 
interestingly, GAA’s computer simulations gave the same error probability in three 
correlation times by using their demanding statistical method as our elementary non-
optimized method provides, as apparent from Fig. 3 in their work [1]. (Note that the 
threshold is at the mean-square value of  I2 , and much greater than the mean-square value 
of  I1 , and therefore a successful measurement is expected to happen with near-unity 
probability during the correlation time of the noise, because the square of a Gaussian 
noise typically goes through virtually all values between zero and its mean-square value 
during the correlation time.) 
 
The ad hoc and non-optimized protocol described above, and its small error probability, 
serve as an illustration of the astronomically large information leak that is caused by the 
attenuator artifact in GAA’s work [1]. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
A recent paper by Gunn–Allison–Abbott [1] claimed that the KLJN secure key exchange 
system—referred to by them as the “Kish key distribution system”—could display a 
devastating information leak. The present paper refuted their results and showed that 
GAA’s arguments arise from a serious deficiency in the design of their system. 
Specifically, GAA used an attenuator which broke the single Kirchhoff-loop, which is an 
essential feature for the security in the KLJN system. Therefore GAA’s alleged 
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information leak is trivial. We also cracked GAA’s scheme via an elementary current-
comparison attack, which yielded negligible error probability for Eve in a short time of 
the order of the correlation time of the noise.  
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